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Abstract
Contact tracing is an important tool for allowing countries to ease lock-
down policies introduced to combat SARS-CoV-2. For contact tracing to
be effective, those with symptoms must self-report themselves while their
contacts must self-isolate when asked. However, policies such as legal en-
forcement of self-isolation can create trade-offs by dissuading individuals from
self-reporting. We use an existing branching process model to examine which
aspects of contact tracing adherence should be prioritised. We consider an
inverse relationship between self-isolation adherence and self-reporting en-
gagement, assuming that increasingly strict self-isolation policies will result
in fewer individuals self-reporting to the programme. We find that policies
that increase the average duration of self-isolation, or that increase the prob-
ability that people self-isolate at all, at the expense of reduced self-reporting
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rate, will not decrease the risk of a large outbreak and may increase the risk,
depending on the strength of the trade-off. These results suggest that policies
to increase self-isolation adherence should be implemented carefully. Policies
that increase self-isolation adherence at the cost of self-reporting rates should
be avoided.
Keywords: COVID-19, contact tracing, branching processes, SARS-CoV-2,
adherence, engagement, case isolation, quarantine
1. Background1
Since the first cases of SARS-CoV-2 in China in late 20191 the virus has2
spread globally, resulting in over 600,000 confirmed deaths by August 20202.3
Lockdown in the UK began in March 20203 and reduced R0 below 1 while4
also triggering unprecedented reductions in economic activity4. As lockdown5
restrictions are relaxed, both in the UK and in other countries, other methods6
for keeping R0 below one are needed. Large-scale contact tracing is one of7
the potential methods for keeping virus spread under control5,6,7.8
During the current SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, contact tracing has been used9
to great effect in a number of countries including Vietnam and South Ko-10
rea8,9. Two broad classes of contact tracing include manual tracing and11
digital tracing using a smartphone app10. Manual contract tracing is the12
only system currently running in the UK though it is expected that a con-13
tact tracing app will be launched soon. In manual contact tracing, trained14
public health staff ask a case for the names and contact details of people they15
have recently been in close proximity with, as well as asking for information16
on which public areas the infected person has visited. The tracers will then17
identify as many contacts as possible and ask them to self-isolate for a period.18
Adherence to the contact tracing system is an important determinant of its19
efficacy11,6,10.20
Adherence applies to a number of different aspects of contact tracing12.21
Untraced individuals with symptoms must report themselves to the contact22
tracing system. They then must give identifying information about the peo-23
ple they have been in close proximity with. Then, both the index case, and24
the traced contacts, must self-isolate for a period13,14. If the contact trac-25
ing system uses home swab tests, the swabs must be taken carefully15,16.26
Adherence to each of these steps will be imperfect.27
Although there are many unobserved variables involved, we can start to28
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examine some of these adherence rates using public statistics from the UK29
tracing system17. For example, of the 6,923 people who were referred to30
the contact tracing system between the 11th and 17th of June, 70% were31
reached. However, these 6,923 cases certainly do not represent 100% of the32
new cases in the country that week. Of the 6,923, 74% gave details of at33
least one contact though it is not possible to tell how many of the remaining34
26% actually had no contacts. 82% of close contacts were reached and asked35
to self-isolate.36
However, these adherence rates are not fixed parameters and can be influ-37
enced by policy. For example, economic support for those missing work14,18,38
daily phonecalls to monitor adherence19 or legal ramifications for break-39
ing self-isolation, such as those implemented in Singapore and Taiwan19,40
might be expected to increase self-isolation rates18 . In particular, this work41
was originally undertaken in response to a question from policy makers ask-42
ing whether legally mandating self-isolation for close-contacts would reduce43
transmission rates. Furthermore there are likely to be trade-offs and de-44
pendencies between parameters. In particular, contact tracing relies on self45
reporting of symptoms in order to initially identify a chain of transmission46
but introducing penalties for non-compliance to self-isolation might be ex-47
pected to decrease the proportion of people that report themselves to the48
system in the first instance. In general there are few direct, individual bene-49
fits to self reporting oneself to a contact tracing system; instead the benefits50
are communal and the drivers for self reporting are likely to be altruism or51
social norms20,21. However, there are direct costs both to the individual that52
self reports and to their close contacts. Self-isolation is mentally difficult2253
and will come with economic costs for many20,23,24,14,25. Legally enforcing54
self-isolation exacerbates these costs.55
The exact form that these trade-offs would take are difficult to know.56
Adherence to self-isolation requirements might largely be binary with people57
complying for the full 14 days (as requested in the UK) or not adhering58
at all. In this case, legal enforcement would be expected to increase the59
proportion of people that self-isolate. Alternatively, it is possible that self-60
isolation adherence is more continuous with people adhering for a few days61
instead of the full 14 days. Similarly, legal enforcement might be expected62
to increase the duration of isolation. Finally, if swab tests are being self-63
administered, people might be less careful or less willing to endure discomfort64
if the consequences of a positive test are more severe (though this might65
change as saliva tests are produced26,27). While it is difficult to know the66
3
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functional effects of different levels of compliance, it is even more difficult to67
quantify the strengths of the trade-offs. Legal enforcement might have a weak68
effect on improving self-isolation adherence22 but a strong deterrent effect69
on self-reporting. Alternatively, perhaps legal mandation has a strong effect70
on self-isolation adherence without being a strong deterrent to self-reporting71
rates Furthermore, the shapes of these trade-offs are likely to differ in different72
countries and social groups based on culture, trust in the government and73
other factors. Careful quantitative and qualitative studies will need to be74
conducted to quantify these effects.75
Here we use a previously published branching process model11,6 to exam-76
ine the effects of these trade-offs on the risk of a large outbreak of SARS-CoV-77
2. We examine trade-offs between self-isolation duration and self-isolation78
probability with self-reporting rates, contact information reporting probabil-79
ities and sensitivity of home swab tests. It is important to note however that80
we do not consider the societal costs28 of legal enforcement of self-isolation;81
we aim to quantify the benefits of these policies without considering the costs82
noting that the costs are not easy to directly compare to the benefits.83
2. Methods84
In this paper we extend a previous model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission11.85
An overview of the model is given in Figure S1 while parameter values and86
references are given in Table 1. At the individual-level, the number of po-87
tential secondary contacts are modelled by a negative binomial distribution88
while the exposure times of these new infections are modelled as a gamma89
distribution. Self-isolating individuals are assumed to be unable to transmit90
the disease (assuming isolation within households) and therefore potential91
secondary cases are avoided if the gamma-distributed exposure time occurs92
during self-isolation of the primary case. The timing of self-isolation depends93
on whether the case was traced as a potential contact or not and a number94
of factors affecting adherence as described in detail below. The model pro-95
ceeds as a branching process with each simulation being seeded with twenty96
untraced, infected individuals.97
2.1. Secondary case distribution98
The heterogeneity in the number of potential secondary cases caused by99
an individual is modelled as a negative binomial distribution. For symp-100
tomatic cases we use a mean value of 1.3 secondary cases while asymptomatic101
4
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Parameter Values Refs
Self-isolation probability 30%–90% 32
Self-reporting probability 30%–90%
Test sensitivity 35%–65% 33,34,35
Minimum isolation duration 1–14 days
Maximum isolation duration 7, 14 days
Contact tracing coverage (%) 40%–80%
Number of initial cases 20
Symptomatic RS under physical
distancing
1.3
Asymptomatic RS under physical
distancing
0.65
Dispersion of RS, k 0.16
31,11
Proportion asymptomatic 50% 36,37
Delay: onset to isolation 1 day
Incubation period (Lognormal) mean log: 1.43, sd log: 0.66 38
Infection time (Gamma) shape: 2.12, rate: 0.69 day−1 38
Infection time shift -3 days 38
Time to trace contacts (days) 1 day
Delay: isolate to test result 1 days
Table 1: Model parameters values/ranges. Parameters taken from the literature are fixed
and for other parameters a range of values are explored.
cases are given a 50% lower infection rate. This relates to a scenario where102
strong social distancing and good hygiene is still being observed. Earlier103
work6,7 and preliminary analyses indicated that contact tracing is unable104
keep the risk of an outbreak low without being paired with social distancing105
so this is the scenario we focus on. Estimates for the dispersion parameter,106
k, for SARS-COV-2 range from k = 0.1 (0.05–0.2) for pre-lockdown UK29 to107
k = 0.25 (0.13–0.88) for Tianjin, China during lockdown measures30. Given108
this range we have kept the parameter as used in11,31 setting k = 0.16. This109
value of k yield a strongly skewed distribution with most individuals causing110
zero potential secondary cases.111
2.2. Infection profile112
Individuals are labelled as symptomatic or asymptomatic with a proba-113
bility of 50%36,37. The onset time of symptoms is modelled as a lognormal114
5
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Figure 1: Overview of adherence in test and trace. An untraced individual must self-
report and give the name and details of close contacts. The contact tracing team must then
manage to contact the close contacts. The close contacts must self-isolate when asked and
remain in self-isolation for the full isolation period (14 days in the UK). In some systems,
the isolated individual is given a self-administered swab test which must be administered
correctly. There is imperfect adherence or performance at each of these stages. In this
paper we focus on trade-offs between self-report rate (stage 1) and self-isolation adherence
(stages 4 and 5). We combine stages 2 and 3 into one parameter, which we call control
effectiveness.
distribution with mean 1.43 days and sd of 0.6639. All individuals, whether115
symptomatic or asymptomatic are given a symptom onset time as the expo-116
sure time of secondary cases is calculated relative to this time. The exposure117
time for each new potential case is drawn from a gamma distribution with118
shape parameter of 17.77 and a rate of 1.39 day−1. This distribution is cen-119
tred three days before the onset of transmission38. The sampled exposure120
time is compared to the infector’s exposure time and resampled if it occurs121
before the infector was infected. If the exposure time of a potential secondary122
case occurs during the primary case’s self-isolation, the infection event does123
not occur and the Ppotential secondary case does not become a case. These124
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distributions are shown in Figure S2.125
2.3. Contact tracing126
The first stage in the contact tracing system is an untraced, symptomatic127
individual self-reporting themselves. The control effectiveness, i.e. the pro-128
portion of an individual’s epidemiological contacts that are recalled, divulged129
and successfully contacted by the contact tracing team, is varied between130
40%–80%. If contact tracing is successful, the traced individual is asked to131
self-isolate. We assume it takes one day to contact a contact. If a traced con-132
tact subsequently shows symptoms or returns a positive test the next round133
of contact tracing is initiated. That is, the contacts of the traced contact are134
then traced.135
2.4. Testing136
As a baseline we assume that tests have a sensitivity of 65% and that137
it takes one day for results to be returned. This reflects the sensitivity of138
tests observed in the community34,33. Given a positive test result contact139
tracing for the tested individual is initiated. A negative test allows the tested140
individual to be immediately released from quarantine. Any contacts of a141
negative-testing case that were successfully identified prior to receiving the142
test result are still isolated and tested. In a branching process model only143
infected individuals are modelled. Therefore we do not track the number of144
uninfected people that are unnecessarily asked to quarantine. Test specificity145
affects the number of uninfected people asked to quarantine but does not146
directly affect the spread of the disease and therefore we do not define a test147
specificity. In this study we are concerned with quantifying the benefits of148
contact tracing and do not attempt to weigh the epidemiological benefits149
against the sociological costs.150
2.5. Adherence trade-offs151
We consider three main trade-offs. As we do not have good data to152
define the shapes of these trade-offs we run simulations for all combinations153
of parameters.154
First, we assume that without policies to encourage self-isolation most155
people attempt some self-isolation but the lack of adherence is with respect156
to the duration of self-isolation that decreases. We keep the probability157
of self-isolation constant at 70%. We assume that each person that does158
self-isolate isolates for an amount of time taken from a uniform distribution159
7
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between a minimum and maximum value. For the maximum values we use160
either the full 14 days currently recommended in the UK or a shorter seven161
day maximum isolation. We vary the minimum duration of self-isolation162
from 1 day to being equal to the maximum duration.163
Second, we examine the trade-off between self-report probability and self-164
isolation probability. We expect that policies that increase self-isolation prob-165
ability will reduce self-report probability. We use values of self-isolation from166
10% – 70% in increments of 20% and examine all combinations with self-167
report probabilities from 10% – 70% also in increments of 20%. The upper168
bound for self-isolation here is certainly above the rate of self-isolation cur-169
rently being achieved in the UK. However, it is below the target rate for170
other national contact tracing programmes32. Furthermore, the very strict171
restrictions applied to travellers entering countries such as Singapore could172
also be considered an upper bound on feasible policies. Many of the policies173
used in these areas, such as enforced isolation in government run hotels, GPS174
ankle bracelets, and daily video calls, would be considered draconion if ap-175
plied to the population at large but could be reasonably expected to produce176
self-isolation rates of 90%. In contrast to the first trade-off, we assume that177
everyone that does self-isolate does so for the full maximum value of either178
7 or 14 days.179
Finally, we assume that policies that increase self-isolation probability will180
decrease test sensitivity. This scenario applies to the case of home adminis-181
tered tests. With strong incentives to test negative, people will be less likely182
to perform swabs correctly. We therefore examine a range of test sensitivities183
from a baseline of 65% down to 35% in increments of 10%.184
2.6. Simulation process185
Results presented are the combined output of 15,000 simulations for each186
parameter combination, or scenario, considered. We define a simulation as187
leading to a large outbreak if it has more than 2,000 cumulative cases or if188
there are still infected cases after 300 days. The threshold of 2,000 cases was189
chosen by running simulations with a maximum of 5,000 cases and noting190
that of the simulated epidemics that went extinct, 99% of extinction events191
occurred before reaching 2,000 cases. Nearly all simulations either went ex-192
tinct or reached 2,000 cases with very few simulations lasting longer than193
300 days. These simulations were then used to calculate the probability of194
a large outbreak given a certain set of conditions. 95% Clopper-Pearson ex-195
act confidence intervals were also calculated. The model was written in R196
8
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and the code and testing suite40 is publicly available on GitHub (https:197
//github.com/timcdlucas/ringbp/tree/adherence_tradeoff_runs).198
3. Results199
3.1. Trade-off between self-isolation duration against self-report probability200































Figure 2: Trade-off between self isolation time (columns) and self report rate (rows)
with error bars denoting 95% confidence intervals. Individuals self isolate for a randomly
selected duration between min isolation and 14 days. Untraced, symptomatic individuals
self-report with a probability that varies across the rows. The proportion of close contacts
that are divulged and asked to self-isolate varies across the x-axis of each subplot. The
y-axis shows the risk of a large outbreak (greater than 2,000 cases) over 15,000 simulations.
The probability that an individual self-isolates at all is fixed at 70%. If we assume we are
currently near the top left we expect that introducing legal ramifications for breaking self
isolation to move us down and right. This generally increases risk.
We find that increasing the duration of self-isolation increases the risk of201
a large outbreak in the presence of reductions in self-reporting rates. The202
probability of a large outbreak for all combinations of self-isolation duration203
and self-report rates are shown in Figure 2. If we assume that we are currently204
in the top left panel (high self report rates but isolation taken uniformly205
9
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between 1 and 14 days), policies that move us down and right generally206
increase the risk of a large outbreak. For example, if we consider a control207
effectiveness of 60%, with a self-isolation duration of between 1 and 14 days208
and a self-report rate of 70% the risk of a large outbreak is 1%. If we increase209
the self-isolation duration to always be 14 days but reduce the self-report rate210
to 10%, the probability of a large outbreak increases from 1% to 6%. If the211
trade-off is very weak, such that increasing self-isolation duration to always212
be 14 days only decreases self-report rates to 50%, we see no change in the213
probability of an outbreak.214
If we assume a more pessimistic starting scenario of a self-isolation du-215
ration of between 1 and 14 days and self-reporting rates of 10% and given a216
control effectiveness of 60% we have a 6% risk of a large outbreak. We find217
that increasing self-report rates gives a larger reduction in risk. Increasing218
self-report rates from 10% to 70% reduces risk from 6% to 1%. In contrast,219
increasing the duration of isolation to always being 14 days does not change220
the risk of a large outbreak. We find that reducing the maximum isolation221
duration from 14 days to 7 days consistently increases the risk of a large222
outbreak (Figure S3–S5).223
3.2. Trade-off between self-isolation probability against self-report probability224
We find that increasing self-isolation probability while decreasing self re-225
port probability does not strongly alter the probability of a large outbreak.226
The probability of a large outbreak for all combinations of self-isolation rates227
and self-report rates are shown in Figure 3. If we assume that we are cur-228
rently in the top left panel (high self report rates but low self-isolation rates),229
policies that increase self-isolation rates but decrease self-report rates would230
move us down and right. However, whether this decreases the risk of an231
outbreak depends on the strength of the trade-off. For example, if we con-232
sider a control effectiveness of 60%, with a self-isolation rate of 10% and a233
self-report rate of 70% the risk of a large outbreak is 6%. If we increase the234
self-isolation rate to 70% and equivalently reduce the self-report rate to 10%,235
the probability of a large outbreak is still 6%. If the trade-off is weak, such236
that increasing self-isolation from 10% to 70% only incurs a reduction in self-237
report rate to 50%, the reduction in risk of a large outbreak is substantial,238
reducing from 6% to 1.5%. However, if the trade-off is strong, such that239
increasing self-isolation from 10% to 30% causes a reduction in self reporting240
rate from 70% to 10%, the risk of an outbreak instead marginally increases241
from 6% to 7%.242
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Figure 3: Trade-off between self-isolation probability (columns) and self-report probabil-
ity (rows) with error bars denoting 95% confidence intervals. The y-axis shows the risk of
a large outbreak (greater than 2,000 cases) over 15,000 simulations. If we assume we are
currently near the top left we expect that introducing legal ramifications for breaking self
isolation to move us down and right. Whether this decreases risk depends on the strength
of the trade-off. If the trade-off is weak, such that as we move from the top left to isola-
tion probability of 70% and self report probability of 50%, risk is reduced. In contrast, if
increasing isolation probability from 10% to 30% incurs a drop in self reporting from 70%
to 10%, risk does not change.
We could instead assume a more pessimistic starting scenario of self-243
isolation rates of 10% and self-reporting rates of 10%. Given a control ef-244
fectiveness of 60% we have a 7% risk of a large outbreak. However, from245
this scenario we can consider whether it is better to increase self-isolation246
or to increase self-reporting. Increasing self isolation probability to 70% re-247
duces risk to 6% and increasing self-report probability to 70% also reduces248
risk to 6%. Increasing both to 30% reduces risk to 5%. Overall, these two249
parameters are relatively evenly balanced.250
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Figure 4: Trade-off between self isolation probability (columns) and test sensitivity (rows)
with error bars denoting 95% confidence intervals. Untraced, symptomatic individuals self-
report with a probability that varies across the rows. The proportion of close contacts
that are divulged and asked to self-isolate varies across the x-axis of each subplot. If we
assume we are currently near the top left, introducing legal ramifications for breaking self
isolation might move us down and right. This generally decreases risk unless the trade off
is very strong such that a small increase in isolation probability incurs a large decrease in
test sensitivity.
3.3. Trade-off between self-isolation duration against test sensitivity251
To model a decrease in careful administration of home swab tests, we252
vary the test sensitivity and isolation adherence. We find that increasing253
self-isolation rates decreases the risk of a large outbreak even if this occurs254
in combination with reductions in test sensitivity. The probability of a large255
outbreak for all combinations of self-isolation rate and test sensitivity are256
shown in Figure 4. If we assume that we are currently in the top left panel257
(relatively high test sensitivity but low self-isolation rates), policies that in-258
crease self-isolation rates but decrease test sensitivity would move us down259
and right and this in general yields reduced risks of a large outbreak. For260
example, if we consider a control effectiveness of 60%, with a self-isolation261
rate of 10% and a test sensitivity of 65% the risk of a large outbreak is 6%. If262
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we increase the self-isolation rate to 70% while reducing the test sensitivity263
to 35%, the probability of a large outbreak reduces from 6% to 3%.264
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4. Discussion265
Overall we have found that policies that increase self-isolation rates at266
the expense of self-report rates are unlikely to improve the effectiveness of267
contact tracing systems. If the primary trade-off is between the duration268
of self-isolation and the probability of self-reporting, we find that policies269
that increase self-isolation and reduce self-report rates will cause either an270
increase or no change in the probability of a large outbreak depending on the271
strength of the trade-off. When the primary trade-off was instead between the272
probability of self-isolation and the rate of self report policies that increase273
self-isolation rates and reduce self-report rates can increase or marginally274
decrease the probability of a large outbreak depending on the strength of275
the trade-off. Overall this implies that policies such as fines, and police276
enforcement of self-isolation will have either little benefit or a negative effect.277
Broadly, policies that improve self-report rates, even at the expense of self-278
isolation rates should be used. This might include publicity that encourages279
people to self-report by reminding them that there are no legal consequences280
to them or their contacts for doing so.281
Policies that improve self-report rates or self-isolation rates without an282
associated trade-off will also improve contact tracing efficacy. For example,283
economic support and employment protection for individuals that self-isolate284
would be expected to improve self-isolation rates14,18,25 without decreasing285
self-report rates. Similarly, efforts to communicate the reasons why people286
should self-report and self-isolate may improve both of these rates simulta-287
neously18,25.288
One of the core assumptions to this work is that legal consequences for289
breaking self-isolation would improve self-isolation rates. However, the evi-290
dence for this is not strong and there is evidence that feelings of shame do not291
promote adherence21,25. In contrast there is good evidence that other factors292
such as income and boredom41 do affect self-isolation rates. How effectively293
legal consequences for breaking self-isolation can increase self-isolation rates294
is a complex question that will depend on cultural norms, perceived enfor-295
cability, and the strength of economic and psychological consequences for296
self-isolation. An important consequence of this is that self-isolation rates297
and the effectiveness of policies aimed to improve these rates will be strongly298
correlated such that individuals that are most likely to infect each other are299
also likely to have similar self-isolation rates. This is not included in our300
model but has the potential to strongly reduce contact tracing efficacy in301
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certain groups and locations.302
With regards to test sensitivity, our results are relevant only to self-303
administered swab-tests. Swab-tests may be replaced with reliable paper-304
based tests. Given that we found that optimising self-isolation rates over305
test-sensitivity minimises risk, other considerations such as test timing and306
access are probably more important. Furthermore, currently in the UK,307
traced contacts are not allowed out of quarantine after a negative test so the308
system is more robust to low test sensitivity than in our simulations.309
Here we have focused solely on the probability of a large outbreak as a310
consequence of policy change. However, there are other costs and benefits to311
changing values of self-report rates and self-isolation rates. High self-report312
rates not only improves contact tracing efficacy directly, it also creates a more313
effective system for measuring the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 in the commu-314
nity. This gives better early warning for when an outbreak is beginning in315
an area or group and allows for health care resources to be deployed more316
efficiently. In contrast, self-isolation comes with many economic and social317
costs both for the individual and the community. Avoiding strict penalties318
for breaking self-isolation allows those most affected by these costs to self-319
isolate less and may increase buy-in to the system as a whole. Furthermore,320
enforcement of self-isolation policies are an infringement on a basic liberty.321
While we have not tried to compare these costs to the epidemiological bene-322
fits, they must always be taken into account when implementing policy.323
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Figure S1: Overview of the contact tracing process implemented in our model. Person A isolates and self-reports to the
contact tracing programme with some delay after symptom onset, by which time they have infected Persons B and C. When
Person A self-reports contact tracing is initiated. They are then tested with positive result and remain isolated for their
infectious period. Person B was infected by A prior to their symptom onset and is detected by tracing after some delay,
after infecting Person D. After isolating they are tested, with a false negative result. This leads to B either a) stopping
isolation immediately or b) finishing a minimum 7 day isolation period. Both may allow new onward transmission. Person
C was infected by A but not traced as a contact. Person C does not develop symptoms but is infectious, leading to missed
transmission. Person D was traced and tested before the false negative test was returned for Person B. The test for D returns
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Figure S2: Distributions for a) incubation period (exposure time to symptom onset) from
Li et al.39; b) transmission profile relative to symptom onset, fitted to data and compared
to He et al.38; c) serial interval, fitted and compared to He et al.38; and d) generation
interval, combined distribution from a) and b) with re-sampling to prevent negative serial
intervals, as described in the main text.
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Max Isolation Duration (days) 7 14
Figure S3: Trade-off between self isolation time (columns) and self report rate (rows)
with error bars denoting 95% confidence intervals. Individuals self isolate for a randomly
selected duration between min isolation4 and 14 days. Untraced, symptomatic individuals
self-report with a probability that varies across the rows. The proportion of close contacts
that are divulged and asked to self-isolate varies across the x-axis of each subplot. Self
isolation probability is fixed at 70%. If we assume we are currently near the top left we
expect that introducing legal ramifications for breaking self isolation to move us down and
right. This generally increases risk.
25
 . CC-BY 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. (which was not certified by peer review)
The copyright holder for this preprint this version posted August 22, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.08.20.20178558doi: medRxiv preprint 



































Isolation Duration (days) 7 14
Figure S4: Trade-off between self isolation probability (columns) and self report (rows)
with error bars denoting 95% confidence intervals. If we assume we are currently near the
top left we expect that introducing legal ramifications for breaking self isolation to move
us down and right. Whether this decreases risk depends on the strength of the trade-off.
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Figure S5: Trade-off between self isolation time (columns) and self report rate (rows)
with error bars denoting 95% confidence intervals. Individuals self isolate for a randomly
selected duration between min isolation4 and 14 days. Untraced, symptomatic individuals
self-report with a probability that varies across the rows. The proportion of close contacts
that are divulged and asked to self-isolate varies across the x-axis of each subplot. Self
isolation probability is fixed at 70%. If we assume we are currently near the top left we
expect that introducing legal ramifications for breaking self isolation to move us down and
right. This generally increases risk.
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